Abstract-One general class of attacks on stream ciphers is correlation attacks. Most of previous results regarding performance of correlation attacks have been based entirely on simulations. In this paper, we use random coding bounds for convolutional codes to give a theoretical analysis of a previously proposed correlation attack based on convolutional codes. The results from the theoretical derivation are verified by simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
O NE family of cryptographic primitives that has many properties suitable for use in telecommunication applications is binary additive stream ciphers. In a binary stream cipher, the keystream, the plaintext, and the ciphertext are sequences of binary digits. The keystream is generated from a keystream generator, which takes a secret key as a seed, and produces a long pseudorandom sequence. In an additive stream cipher, the keystream depends neither on the plaintext nor on the ciphertext. The ciphertext is generated by bitwise addition (modulo ) of the keystream and the plaintext. This is illustrated in Fig. 1 . Since the secret key is shared between the transmitter and the receiver, the receiver can decrypt, and obtain the message sequence, by adding the output of the keystream generator to the ciphertext.
Linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) are basic building blocks of many keystream generators. In such cases, the secret key is often chosen to be the initial state of the LFSRs. Thus, we often assume that the feedback polynomials of the LFSRs are known. The goal in stream cipher design is to efficiently produce random-looking sequences that in all senses are "indistinguishable" from truly random sequences. From a cryptanalysis point of view, a good stream cipher should be resistant against a known-plaintext attack. For a synchronous stream cipher, a known-plaintext attack is equivalent to the problem of finding the key that produced a given keystream sequence of length , . This can easily be shown as follows. Assume that an attacker possesses a plaintext sequence and the corresponding ciphertext sequence . Then the attacker can calculate the keystream as for . Throughout this paper, we hence assume that a given keystream sequence is in the cryptanalyst's possession and that cryptanalysis is the problem of restoring the secret key.
There are several classes of general cryptanalytic attacks against stream ciphers [19] . One of the most important class of attacks on LFSR-based stream ciphers is correlation attacks. Let denote the output from one of the LFSRs in the keystream generator. Assume that a correlation between the known keystream sequence and the output of one individual LFSR has been detected, i.e., , see Fig. 2 . This detected correlation can be used in a "divide-and-conquer" type of attack on the individual LFSR [29] , [30] , [17] , [18] . There is no requirement of any further structure in the generator. The only thing that matters is the fact that we can find a correlation.
There exist several standard methodologies for destroying the linear properties of LFSR sequences and providing a keystream sequence with a large linear complexity [19] . One of these methodologies is to combine the output of several LFSRs by a nonlinear function with desired properties. Here is a binary Boolean function in variables, and the generator is then referred to as a nonlinear combination generator. This is depicted in Fig. 3 .
It is worth noticing that for a nonlinear combination generator there always exists a correlation between the generator output and either one or a set of LFSR output symbols . It is well known that if is an -resilient (but not -resilient) function then there is a correlation, which can be expressed in the form It is also known that there is a tradeoff between the resiliency and the nonlinearity of , and hence must be rather small [29] .
Returning to the previously mentioned correlation attacks, the above overview demonstrates that finding a low-complexity algorithm that successfully can use the existing correlation in order to determine a part of the secret key can be a very efficient way of attacking such stream ciphers. After the initial ideas of Siegenthaler [29] , [30] , Meier and Staffelbach [17] , [18] found a very interesting way of exploring the correlation in a fast correlation attack provided that the feedback polynomial of the LFSR has a very low weight, i.e., the number of nonzero coefficients is small. This work was followed by several papers, providing minor improvements to the initial results of Meier and Staffelbach, see [24] , [3] , [4] , [26] . However, the algorithms that were efficient (good performance and low complexity) still required the feedback polynomial to be of low weight. Due to this requirement, it was a general advise in stream cipher design that the generator polynomial should not be of too low weight.
More recently, steps in other directions were taken, and in [11] it was suggested to use convolutional codes in order to improve performance. This was followed by a generalization in [12] , applying the use of iterative decoding and turbo codes. The main advantage compared with previous results was the fact that these algorithms now applied to a linear feedback polynomial of arbitrary form. Very recently, several other suggested methods and improvements have appeared, see [2] , [20] , [1] , [13] , [21] - [23] .
The purpose of this paper is to make a theoretical analysis of the attack based on convolutional codes presented by the authors in [11] . The theoretical analysis is based on a random coding bound for time-varying convolutional codes. The result from the analysis is a bound on when the attack in [11] will be successful. Hence, we can get theoretical estimates of the performance of the attack in cases were simulations are impossible. Another algorithm where such a result is known is the attack presented in [2] . Results in this direction are also discussed in [6] , [9] , and [25] . The advantage of having theoretical results for the performance of an attack is exemplified by applying the results on a nonlinear filter generator.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we give some preliminaries on the decoding model that is used for cryptanal- ysis, and we shortly review some previous ideas for fast correlation attacks. In Section III, we describe the algorithm using low-rate convolutional codes. The theoretical analysis of the attack is given in Section IV. Section V presents some simulation results and verifies the obtained theoretical results. In Section VI, we use the theoretical results to calculate the complexity for an attack on a nonlinear filter generator. Finally, in Section VII, we give some conclusions and possible extensions.
II. CORRELATION ATTACKS-AN OVERVIEW
The model for correlation attacks shown in Fig. 2 is often viewed as a decoding problem, see for instance [30] , [17] , [18] , [24] , [3] . Let the LFSR have length and let the set of possible LFSR sequences be denoted by . Clearly, , and for a fixed length the set of all truncated sequences from is also a linear block code [16] , referred to as . Thus, the LFSR sequence is regarded as a codeword from and the keystream sequence is regarded as the received channel output. From the definition of the correlation between and , we can describe each as the output from the binary-symmetric channel (BSC) when was transmitted. The correlation probability , defined by , gives as the crossover probability (error probability) in the BSC. Without loss of generality, we can assume . This is all shown in Fig. 4 . The cryptanalyst's problem can be formulated as follows. Given a length received word as output of the BSC, find the length codeword from that was transmitted.
From simple coding arguments, it can be shown that the length should be at least around for unique decoding, where is the binary entropy function. If the length of the output sequence is modest but allows unique decoding, say , where is a constant, the fastest methods for decoding are probabilistic decoding algorithms like Leon or Stern algorithms [15] , [31] .
For received sequences of large length , fast correlation attacks [17] , [18] are sometimes applicable. By fast correlation attacks we mean attacks significantly faster than exhaustive search. In [17] , [18] , Meier and Staffelbach presented two algorithms for fast correlation attacks. Instead of the exhaustive search as originally suggested in [30] , the algorithms are based on using certain parity-check equations created from the feedback polynomial of the LFSR. The algorithms have two different phases. In the first phase, a set of suitable parity-check equations in the code is found. The second phase uses these parity-check equations in a fast decoding algorithm to recover the transmitted codeword and hence the initial state of the LFSR.
Parity-check equations in [17] , [18] were created in two separate steps. Let be the feedback polynomial, and the number of taps of the LFSR, i.e., the number of nonzero coefficients of is . The symbol number of the LFSR sequence can then be written as
Since the weight of is , we get in this way different parity-check equations for . Second, using the fact that for , parity-check equations are also generated by repeatedly squaring the polynomial . The obtained parity-check equations are then valid in each index position of .
The total number of parity-check equations, denoted , that can be found in this two steps is , where uses base [17] , [18] .
In the second phase, the parity-check equations for each position , are used in a decoding algorithm. Two different decoding methods were suggested in [17] , [18] . The algorithms were called, Algorithm A and Algorithm B, respectively. For a complete description of the decoding methods see [17] , [18] .
The algorithms mentioned above work well when the LFSR contains few taps, but for LFSRs with many taps the algorithms fail. The reason for this failure is that for LFSRs with many taps each parity-check equation gives a very small average correction and hence many more equations are needed in order to succeed. Or in other words, the maximum correlation probability that the algorithms can handle is much lower when the LFSR has many taps . Due to the fact that the above attacks require the feedback polynomial to have a low weight, one usually refrains from using such feedback polynomials in stream cipher design. Minor improvements for the above algorithms were suggested in, e.g., [24] and [3] .
III. FAST CORRELATION ATTACKS BASED ON CONVOLUTIONAL CODES
The general idea behind the algorithm to be described, proposed by the authors in [11] , is to consider slightly more advanced decoding algorithms including memory, but which still have a low decoding complexity. This allows weaker restrictions on the parity-check equations that can be used, leading to many more and more powerful equations.
We now describe the algorithm. As most other algorithms for correlation attacks it has two phases. In the first phase, the algorithm transforms a part of the code stemming from the LFSR sequences into a convolutional code. The encoder of this convolutional code is created by finding suitable parity-check equations from . In the decoding step the Viterbi algorithm is used for decoding. It is assumed that the reader is familiar with basic concepts regarding convolutional codes, see also [10] , [11] .
Let be a fixed memory size and let denote the code rate. In a convolutional encoder with memory and rate the information sequence is encoded as the code sequence where
Here each , , is a vector of length . The purpose of the first pass of the algorithm is to find suitable parity-check equations that will determine the vectors , defining the convolutional code. Let us start with the linear code stemming from the LFSR sequences. There is a corresponding generator matrix, here referred to as , such that , where denotes the initial state of the LFSR, i.e., . The generator matrix is furthermore considered to be written in systematic form,
, where is the identity matrix.
We are now interested in finding parity-check equations that involve a current symbol , and an arbitrary linear combination of the previous symbols , together with at most other symbols. Clearly, should be small and in this description or are mainly considered. To find these desired equations, start by considering the index position . Introduce the following notation for the generator matrix: (2) i.e., is the th column of . Thus, the th LFSR output symbol can be calculated as . Parity-check equations for with weight outside the first positions can then be found by finding linear combinations of columns such their sum is all zero in the last positions and one in position . Assume that we have found columns such that (3) where each , can take any value. By combining (2) and (3), we get the parity-check equation (4) It directly follows from the cyclic structure of the LFSR sequences that (4) is valid for any index position simply by shifting all the symbols in time, resulting in (5) for .
Assume that the above procedure gives us a set of different parity-check equations for LFSR output symbol , written as . . . (6) where is the sum of (at most) positions in . That is, is the right-hand side of (5) for the th parity-check equation. Identifying the parity-check equations from (6) with the described form of the convolutional code as in (1) 
where we have added the systematic bit . Thus, we have obtained a rate convolutional code with memory . For the case , the parity-check equations can be found in a very simple way as follows. A parity-check equation with is found if two columns from have the same value when restricted to the last entries. Hence, we simply put each column of into one of different "buckets," sorted according to the value of the last entries. Each pair of columns in each bucket will provide us with one parity-check equation, provided is included. For , we store the columns in the same way as for . To find a parity-check equation, we run through all pair of columns, add them, and look in the bucket corresponding to the last entries of the sum.
For each defined codeword symbol in the convolutional code, one has an estimate of that symbol from the transmitted sequence . We refer to this sequence as the received sequence and denote it by , where . From the right-hand side of (6) we have , where
The received sequence is constructed as for and . From the construction of the received sequence, we can calculate the probability that a codesymbol of the convolutional code are correctly received as (8) To recover the initial state of the LFSR it is enough to decode consecutive information bits correctly. Optimal decoding (maximum-likelihood (ML) decoding) of the convolutional code using the Viterbi algorithm can thus be performed. The channel model used in the decoding phase is a BSC with crossover probability defined by (8) . For BSCs, ML decoding is equivalent to minimum distance decoding, and hence in our case, there is no need for floating-point arithmetic when implementing the Viterbi algorithm.
The original Viterbi algorithm assumes that the convolutional encoder starts in state . However, in this application there is neither a predefined starting state, nor a predefined ending state for the trellis corresponding to the convolutional code. For each possible starting state , let , where and denotes the Hamming distance between and , be the initial metric for that state when we start the Viterbi algorithm at . Then one runs the Viterbi algorithm over information symbols. At depth , we search for the ending state with minimum metric. The decoder output is then the information sequence corresponding to the surviving path from one of the starting states to the ending state with minimum metric. It is important to note that the decoding algorithm presented here is slightly improved compared to the decoding algorithm originally proposed in [11] . This concludes the general description and we give a detailed summary of the algorithm in Fig. 5 .
IV. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
To simplify the theoretical analysis, we consider some small modifications in the algorithm described in the previous section. First, we consider the convolutional code to be time varying. This can be achieved by applying a random permutation to the columns of and searching for new parity-check equations for each time index. For a more thorough description we refer to [12] . Second, we exclude the systematic symbol , and the rate of our convolutional code is . The principle of the analysis is the following. We start by calculating the average number of parity-check equations that we will find by the proposed algorithm. This gives us the rate of the convolutional code. Depending on the value of we calculate the error probability in an equivalent BSC for the convolutional code. Given the number of equations and the error probability of the BSC, we can use results from convolutional coding to get a bound on the burst error probability of the convolutional code. This burst error probability bounds the probability that the proposed attack fails. Finally, we fix the rate to be , where is the computational cutoff rate [10] . This gives us a rate close to capacity and yet a small error probability. Based on these assumptions, the result of the analysis is the required initial correlation for given keystream length , LFSR length , and algorithm parameters and . We first estimate the number of parity-check equations, similar to [8] .
Lemma 1: Let be the number of parity-check equations in (6) and let be the expected value of . Then Proof: The number of different linear combinations of columns from the last columns of is . Since the rows of is LFSR sequences of length , the entries of are approximately independent and identically distributed random variables with . Thus, each of the different possible values of the last positions for each column, of has the same probability.
Hence, we get in average linear combinations with all zeros in the last positions. Among these linear combinations one half depends on . Thus,
If is small, and
In the model of the correlation attack presented in Section II, the correlation between the LFSR sequence and the keystream is . This can be modeled as a BSC with error probability .
In our case, we consider an "embedded" convolutional code. Then the received symbol corresponding to codeword symbol is given as the sum of keystream symbols
If the expected number of equations is much lower than the observed length, that is, , then the probability that a position appears in more than one equation is small, and thus, different 's can be considered to be independent. Hence, the error probability in (8) can be modeled as a BSC with error probability . The following result is well known.
Lemma 2: Let and Then
Proof: We prove by induction. Let , clearly we have . Assume that the expression is true for . Using Bayes rule we get that can be expressed as Since the channel is memoryless we get and since the lemma holds for by assumption we get Let be the burst error probability [10] , i.e., the probability that we do not decode the convolutional code correctly. To get a bound on the expected burst error probability, , for our convolutional code we use the following lemma, taken from [10, p. 215]. The average is taken over the ensemble of all random rate time-varying convolutional codes encoded by a polynomial generator matrix of memory .
Lemma 3:
The expected burst error probability of a rate , time-varying convolutional code encoded by a polynomial, time-varying generator matrix of memory is upperbounded by where is the computational cutoff rate for the BSC, defined as and where Using the bound for the expected burst error probability we can calculate when the proposed attack will succeed. Let the correlation probability be , i.e.,
The values of for which the attack is successful is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1: With probability , the proposed attack succeeds if where the correlation probability is and is any fixed positive real number.
Proof: We assume that the randomly generated code satisfies the bound in Lemma 3, and that . For a BSC with
Since is very small, we use Taylor's formula to get
The cutoff rate can then be written as
Using the standard expression for we get and for small . Using Lemma 2, we insert , and can be expressed as Assuming very small, we can drop the term. From Lemma 3, we have an expression for the burst error probability given that . Ideally, we want to be as close to as possible. This will, however, cause to increase and we might not get a useful bound on the error probability. Thus, we need to have a code rate slightly less than , say where is a fixed positive real number. By inserting the average number of equations , from Lemma 1, and the expression for we get which give us
The probability that the attack fails is bounded by , where Hence, we get By using that we can rewrite Theorem 1 as the following corollary.
Corollary 1: With probability , the proposed attack succeeds if where the correlation probability is and is any fixed positive real number.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In order to verify the theoretical results, a large number of simulations were made. Most of the simulations use an LFSR with length , and a weight feedback polynomial. The LFSR has the following feedback polynomial:
The algorithm parameter was chosen as and , respectively. Memory varied between and . The simulation results are compared with the theoretical results in Theorem 1. In the theoretical results, we let the distance parameter be . These results are plotted in Figs. 6 and 7, respectively. In these figures, the maximal value of is plotted when is varied. Recall that is the correlation probability. The simulation results are based on the decoding method described in Section III. From Figs. 6 and 7 we can see that for large values of the constant the bound in Theorem 1 is rather tight. It is also important to note that one of the conditions for Theorem 1 to hold is that . However, from the simulations we can see that also in the case when the results from Theorem 1 is close to the actual performance of the algorithm.
We can see in Fig. 6 that for small , the simulation shows better performance than one could expect by the results from Theorem 1. One explanation for this behavior is that in these cases we get rather few equations and the systematic symbol that we exclude in the theoretical analysis has a bigger impact on the result. We should also note that it is possible to have a rate larger than and still have a quite low probability of algorithm failure.
From the simulations, we can also make a comment regarding the complexity of decoding when the value of the parameter is varied. Assume that we have . With and we need memory . The time for a successful decoding in this case was approximately 90 s. With , we only need to get for . In this latter case, the decoding takes approximately 1.5 s. Thus, we can conjecture that it is desirable to increase the value of . However, due to the complexity in the precomputation we cannot use a too large value of .
Some simulations were also made for . The result is tabulated in Table I . From Table I we can see that the results in Theorem 1 is rather tight also for .
VI. EXAMPLE
In this section, we illustrate the importance of having theoretical results for the performance of correlation attacks by an example where we calculate the complexity of attacking a nonlinear filter generator. The principle of a nonlinear filter generator is to generate the keystream as some nonlinear function of the stages of a single LFSR, see Fig. 8 . Nonlinear filter generators can be used directly as a keystream generator, but also as building blocks of more complex generators. Some recent proposals of keystream generators that have a nonlinear filter generator as a component can be found in [5] , [27] .
We use the nonlinear filter generator from LILI-128 [5] as our example. This generator has an LFSR with length . The contents of 10 different stages of the LFSR are inputs to a Boolean function , . The output of is the keystream sequence . Furthermore, the function is chosen to be a -resilient function with nonlinearity . For definitions of concepts regarding Boolean functions, see [28] .
Since the nonlinearity of is we can find a linear function such that
We call the probability in (9) the identified correlation. Now, we apply the algorithm proposed in Section III with the algorithm parameter . If we let and , we can calculate the required amount of observed keystream symbols for having a successful attack. From Corollary 1 we get and , where we used from (9) . The decoding complexity of the attack can be calculated as follows. From Lemma 2, the average number of parity-check equations is . The number of states in the Viterbi decoder is . If we use ML decoding, the decoding complexity, denoted by can be calculated as
The precomputation for this case is approximately table lookups.
Note that the complexity is given as the average number of bit operations in the decoding phase and the average number of table lookups in the precomputation. Thus, for the decoding phase, bit operations is done significantly faster than clock cycles. On the other hand, in the precomputation phase we search for the existence of a certain vector in a large sorted list of vectors. By using a hash table this can be made almost in constant time. However, it will still require more than one clock cycle per operation. This example can be extended to attack the full LILI-128 similar to the attack described in [14] .
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a theoretical analysis of a powerful algorithm for fast correlation attacks. The analysis results in a bound which determines the required number of observed keystream symbols needed in a successful attack. The bound was derived using random coding bounds for convolutional bounds. If we compare the theoretical bound with results obtained by simulations we observe that the bound is rather tight. Thus, we conclude that the results from the theoretical analysis can be used as a tool for evaluating the security of stream ciphers based on LFSRs, where the shift register length makes simulations impossible.
